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Abstract 
This paper simulates the impact across household types of fully funded tax reforms 
designed to increase consumers’ fiber intake from grain consumption. Our results suggest 
that household types with the highest initial consumption share of fiber-rich products – 
i.e., households without children (seniors, couples without children, and single women 
without children) – experience the highest increase in fiber intake from these reforms. 
However, they also experience high increases in unhealthy nutrients from the reforms, 
making the net health effects difficult to evaluate. Seniors and couples without children 
also gain the most financially, paying less food taxes and facing, depending on the 
reform, either a lower price level than before the reform or a lower increase in the price 
level than the average household. These household types also face the lowest initial price 
level. Households with the lowest initial consumption share of fiber-rich products – 
families with children – appear to gain the least financially from the reforms: they pay 
more food taxes and face relatively high increases in price levels. Further, in general they 
experience an increase in fiber intake smaller than the average household. However, they 
do generally see reductions in the intake of added sugar, and in many cases saturated fat, 
which positively affects the health of families with children, who often overconsume 
these nutrients.  
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1. Introduction 
The modern diet is often rich in empty calories and fat, and has proven to be a significant risk 
factor for several types of cancer, cardiovascular disease, diabetes, osteoporosis, and dental 
caries as well as overweight and obesity, themselves major risk factors of many of these 
diseases. The World Health Organization states that “improving nutrition could be the single 
most important contributor to reducing the burden of disease in the WHO European Region” 
(WHO, 2004, p.27).  Poor diet is estimated to cause, for instance, about one third of 
European cancer deaths and one third of all cardiovascular disease.  Cancer and 
cardiovascular diseases account for almost two thirds of Europe’s total disease burden, 
measured by losses of years of healthy life (WHO, 2004).   
 
In Sweden, direct and indirect costs solely of obesity and overweight (i.e., disregarding all 
other illnesses caused by poor nutrition) have been estimated at SEK 3.6 billion (Persson et 
al. 2004) and SEK 12.4 billion (Persson and Ödegaard, 2005), which is about 3 percent of the 
total costs (direct and indirect) of all illness (Socialstyrelsen, 2003). These costs may be even 
higher in the future due to the time lag between the prevalence of obesity and overweight and 
the serious illnesses that often follow. The externalities imposed on tax payers could justify 
government intervention aimed at encouraging healthier food consumption.  
 
Increasing the intake of dietary fiber would constitute an important improvement of the 
nutritional quality of modern diets. A diet high in fiber has several health-promoting effects: 
helping to maintain a healthy body weight (Burton-Freeman, 2000, Liu et al., 2003), and 
controlling and preventing heart diseases (Liu et al., 1999, Mann, 2002), diabetes (Brand-
Miller et al., 2003, Schulze et al., 2004, Willet et al., 2002), and colorectal cancer (Schatzkin 
et al., 2007). The Swedish National Food Administration (SLV) therefore recommends that 
the average Swedish consumer substantially increases his/her fiber intake. The average 
woman is recommended to increase her intake by a minimum of 56 percent, and the average 
man by a minimum of 38 percent.1 Along with fruit and vegetables, grain products are the 
                                                          
1 The average woman consumes 112 grams of dietary fiber per week, and the average man 126 grams (Becker 
and Pearson, 2002). Recommended weekly levels are 175–245 grams of dietary fiber for both men and women 
(SNR, 1997).  
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most important source of dietary fiber. To increase the fiber intake from grain products 
specifically, the SLV recommends that the average household should ensure that half of the 
volume of bread and breakfast cereals it consumes is “Keyhole” labeled. The “Keyhole” is a 
nutrition symbol certified to products defined as wholesome by the SLV.2 
 
Using grain consumption data, Nordström and Thunström (2009a) simulate the effect of tax 
reforms aimed at encouraging the average household to increase its fiber consumption by the 
minimum recommended 38 percent. The authors found that a 50 percent subsidy of 
wholesome (keyhole labeled) bread and breakfast cereals or a SEK 0.046 subsidy per gram of 
fiber per kilogram of grain product increased the fiber intake of the average household by 38 
percent. However, Nordström and Thunström also show that subsidies in isolation increase 
not only the intake of fiber but also the intake of nutrients that are often overconsumed (fat, 
saturated fat, sugar, added sugar, salt). The authors therefore simulated reforms that are fully 
funded by taxing these nutrients or goods that are considered as unhealthy, and conclude that 
the revenue-neutral tax scheme that appears to be most efficient in redirecting consumption to 
healthier levels is a subsidy on fiber, funded either by an excise duty on added sugar or an 
excise duty on saturated fat. Building on the results in Nordström and Thunström (2009a), we 
analyze the effect across household types of reforms designed to increase the fiber intake 
from grain consumption.  
 
Our focal points when analyzing the impact of these policy reforms across household 
categories is the impact on the intake of fiber and other nutrients, the volumes consumed, 
changes in tax payments by different household types, and the change in the price level faced 
by the household types. To perform the analysis, we estimate a demand system for grain 
products and thereafter simulate the results of the above tax reforms.  
 
Empirical literature on the effects of economic policies aimed at improving the nutritional 
content of food consumed is limited, especially for studies analyzing the effects across 
                                                          
2 Breakfast cereals that meet the following criteria can be certified with the Keyhole logo issued by the SLV: fat 
max. 7g/100g, sugar max. 13g/100g, sodium max. 500mg/100g, fiber min. 1.9g/100 kcal. For soft bread the 
criteria are as follows: fat max. 7g/100g, sugar max. 10g/100g, sodium max. 600mg/100g, fiber min. 1.9g/100 
kcal. For crisp bread, the certification criteria are: fat max. 8g/100g, sodium max. 600mg/100g, and fiber min. 
1.9g/100 kcal. 
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different household types. Smed et al. (2007) analyze the impact of tax reforms on the intake 
of fiber, saturated fat, and sugar across age and income groups. They find that young 
households have a higher elasticity of demand for saturated fat, whereas middle-aged 
households have a higher elasticity of demand for sugar. In general, the lowest income group 
is found to be the most responsive to food price changes. Chouinard et al. (2007) analyze the 
effect of a 10 percent ad valorem tax on the percentage of fat in diary consumption. They 
conclude that the tax has little effect on fat consumption and would also lead to particularly 
large welfare losses for elderly and poorer households.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to analyze the distributional effects of 
policy instruments designed to direct consumption towards specific nutritional 
recommendations. It is also the first study to examine the distributional effects of revenue-
neutral tax schemes incorporating combinations of excise duties on nutrients. This paper 
therefore provides a valuable insight into the effects of different designs of tax schemes that 
could be used to improve the quality of the modern diet, and with important information that 
is not available in an analysis for the average household. 
 
In sections 2 and 3, we present the data and the modeling framework; section 4 contains the 
results of the analysis and section 5 concludes the study. 
 
2. Data 
To estimate the demand system for grain products, we use private market research data from 
“Growth from Knowledge” (GfK) Sweden and household expenditure data (HUT) on bread 
purchases from Statistics Sweden. The GfK data are based on diary recordings of grain 
product purchases for 2003. Our sample consists of the 1336 households who participated in 
the panel for the whole year. The data contain information on daily retail purchases of bakery 
goods, bread, breakfast cereals, frozen and fresh ready-to-eat food, pasta, rice, and flours. The 
product information includes the type, price, and size of the products bought. An exception is 
soft bread, for which the GfK households are only requested to state the total expenditures on 
soft bread. To obtain information on the type of bread purchased, we use the 1996 household 
expenditure data (HUT) from Statistics Sweden, which includes information on the amounts 
of types of soft bread (white or dark) purchased, as well as an index for bread prices.  
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Further, the GfK data contain information on the number of children, the number of adults, 
sex and the age of the head of the household. Based on this information, we control for nine 
different household categories in the estimation and simulations of the tax reforms: single 
woman without children, single woman with children, single man with or without children, 
couple without children, couple with one child, couple with two children, couple with three or 
more children, three or more cohabiting adults (minimum 17 years of age) and senior 
households, of any number of adults and children. 
 
The HUT data comprise 1104 households, and contains the same demographic information as 
the GfK data set, as well as two additional categories: unknown household type with children, 
and unknown household type without children. In addition to the household categories 
defined above for the GfK data these are also controlled for in the estimation.  
 
The products purchased by the GfK and HUT households are matched with their nutritional 
value provided by the nutrient database maintained by the SLV. For convenience, we refer to 
fat, saturated fat, sugar, added sugar, and salt as the “unhealthy” nutrients, due to the fact that 
the average household is likely to overconsume these nutrients. For a household with low 
food consumption, an increased intake of these nutrients might, however, be health 
enhancing. Descriptive statistics of the product contents are given in Table 2.1. 
 
Insert Table 2.1 here. 
 
Table 2.2 shows the proportion of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast cereals consumed 
relative to total bread and breakfast cereal consumption by household type, as well as the 
proportions of bakery goods and ready meals consumed relative to total household 
consumption of grain products. 
 
Insert Table 2.2. here. 
 
 
For the average household, the proportion of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast cereals 
purchased, of total bread and breakfast cereal purchases, is 47 percent. Households without 
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children (single women, couples, and seniors) all achieve the nutritional recommendation that 
half of the bread and breakfast cereals they consume should be Keyhole labeled. Families 
with children far from reach this recommendation, however, and the more children per adult 
head, the lower the share of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast cereals purchased. The 
relatively poor nutrition of families with children is reflected by studies suggesting that 
children overconsume fat and sugar (see e.g., Rasmussen et al., 2004) as well as that adults in 
families with children generally seem to have a higher intake of added sugar and a lower 
intake of fiber than adults in households with no children. This pattern seems to be more 
pronounced for adult women than for adult men (Enghardt Barbieri and Lindvall, 2003).3 
 
 
3. The Modeling Framework 
In the modeling of grain consumption we assume that the decision process take part in 
multiple steps, according to Figure 1. At the highest level, the household allocates its (total) 
resources for grain expenditures between three broad product categories: prepared foods, 
ready meals, and staple goods for cooking. When the household has determined the 
expenditures for each category, it decides how to allocate these expenditures between the 
product groups within each category.  
 
Insert Figure 1 here. 
 
We are unable to observe total household consumption of grain products since some are 
consumed outside the home (e.g., in restaurants and at school). The relative consumption of 
different grain products is, however, likely to be well reflected in the data set. We use the 
quadratic extension (Banks et al. 1997) to Deaton and Muellbauer’s (1980) almost ideal 
demand system – the QAIDS – as our model specification. The QAIDS provides a flexible 
functional form of consumer preferences, based on relative consumption (budget shares). 
Another appealing feature of the QAIDS is that it handles non-linear expenditure (or income) 
                                                          
3 For descriptive statistics on the average budget shares for each household category, see Nordström, J. and 
Thunström, L. (2009) The Impact on Different Household Types of Economic Policies Designed to Increase the 
Fiber Intake from Grain Consumption, HUI Working Paper No 22  
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effects, which may be particularly important when simulating the impact of reforms that lead 
to large price effects. We take into account the differences in consumption patterns between 
household categories by adding intercept and slope parameters in the budget share equations 
of the demand system. As we cannot observe the households’ consumption of other goods, we 
have to assume that household preferences are weakly separable in grain consumption and 
other goods. To reduce the number of estimated parameters, we also assume that household 
preferences are weakly separable into ready meals, staple goods for cooking, and prepared 
foods. The full decision process and the separability assumptions that follow from this process 
are shown in Figure 1.  
 
An econometric consideration arises as not all of the households in the sample purchased all 
of the goods in 2003. For example, for fresh filled and fresh unfilled pasta, the occurrence of 
zero expenditure is as high as 92 and 83 percent. To allow for infrequencies of purchases, 
Blundell and Meghir (1987) presented a bivariate alternative to the Tobit model (Tobin, 1958, 
and Amemiya, 1974) with separate processes determining the censoring rule and the 
continuous observations. It  seems reasonable to assume that there are separate processes 
determining the zero-one decision of buying a good and the decision of how many units to 
actually buy. Therefore, to obtain consistent parameter estimates, we follow Heckman’s 
(1979) two-step procedure and estimate separate probit and truncated regression models for 
each food group.  
 
At the first allocation step household h decides how much of grain products to consume (i.e., 
the resource allocation over staple goods for cooking, prepared foods, and ready meals). 
Based on the simplification of the original model by Blundell et al. (1993), household h’s 
budget share for good k,  in the first allocation stage then takes the form ,hks
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vector of household characteristics, containing the household categories defined in the data 
section. The reference household consists of a full-time working single woman without 
children.  is an error term reflecting unobserved taste variation and r denotes the subsample 
for which .  is the estimated inverse Mills ratio, with 
h
kε
s 0hk > )ˆ(/)ˆ(ˆ hkkhkkhk zz ψψφλ Φ= kψˆ  
estimated in a first step from a univariate probit model for group k (see e.g., Leung and Yu, 
1996). The explanatory variables included in  are the prices of the products in equation k, 
the household income, and the same set of dummy variables as those contained in the d  
vector. Although the notation in equation (1) refers to the demand for the k goods in the first 
allocation stage, the same procedure is used in the estimation of all subdemand systems, see 
Figure 1. For instance, the demand system for the second stage of expenditure allocation has 
the same functional form as (1), and can be written as 
kz
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where  is household h’s budget share for good i within group k,  is the price of 
good j in group k, and  are the total expenditures that household h has allocated to the 
goods in group k in the first-stage allocation problem.  
h
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The expenditure system has a set of within-equation and cross-equation restrictions that we 
impose. Homogeneity is imposed in a first stage by estimating single equations. Since the 
number of observations will differ for different goods after the selection of , we use a 
minimum distance estimator (see Ferguson, 1958) to impose the cross-equation (symmetry) 
restrictions in a second stage. We employ White’s (1980) approach to calculate the standard 
errors. 
0hks >
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3.1 Simulations 
 
Building on the results in Nordström and Thunström (2009a), we will simulate the following 
four revenue-neutral policy reforms:  
 
i A revenue-neutral VAT reform entailing zero VAT on Keyhole-labeled bread and 
breakfast cereals funded by VAT on bakery goods and ready meals of 34.2 percent, 
while maintaining the VAT on all other grain products at the initial 10.71 percent.4  
ii A revenue-neutral VAT reform entailing a 50 percent subsidy of the consumer price of 
Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast cereals funded by 113.8 percent VAT on bakery 
goods and ready meals, while keeping the VAT on all other grain products at the 
initial 10.71 percent. 
iii A revenue-neutral excise duty reform entailing a SEK 0.046 subsidy per gram of fiber 
per kilogram of grain product, funded by an excise duty of SEK 0.182 per gram of 
added sugar.  
iv A revenue-neutral excise duty reform entailing a SEK 0.046 subsidy per gram of fiber 
per kilogram of grain product, funded by an excise duty of SEK 0.325 per gram of 
saturated fat.  
 
In the simulations we start by calculating the percentage price change due to a specific tax 
reform, and translate these changes to post-reform prices and Stone price indices. The VAT 
on food in Sweden is 10.71 percent of the consumer price (or, equivalently, 12 percent of the 
producer price), which constitutes the baseline for the analysis. The estimated parameters 
from the demand system and the post-reform Stone price index, as well as the estimated error 
terms, for the first allocation stage are thereafter substituted into the expenditure equations for 
the first allocation stage (as specified by equation (1)), and new budget shares are calculated. 
Assuming separability between grain consumption and other consumption, the post-reform 
total nominal expenditures are the same as the ex ante reform nominal expenditures on grain 
consumption. We therefore multiply the post-reform budget shares from the first allocation 
                                                          
4 Subsidies are not applied to Keyhole-labeled flours that could be used for bread making, since they could also 
be used for other, less healthy, purposes. 
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stage by the pre-reform nominal expenditures for total grain consumption, which gives us the 
post-reform nominal expenditures for prepared food, staple goods for cooking, and ready 
meals. These expenditures and the new Stone price indices are, in turn, substituted into the 
estimated equations representing the second allocation stage, and new budget shares are 
calculated. In the case of additional subgroups, the procedure is repeated for the subsequent 
allocation stages.  
 
In addition to calculating new budget shares, we also calculate the change in the consumption 
volume for each product. The change in the intake of different nutrients (e.g., fiber, added fat, 
or added sugar) due to the reform, is obtained by multiplying the change in consumption 
volume of a certain product by the content per kilogram of a specific nutrient in that particular 
product (see Table 2.2). In the simulations we also calculate the percentage change in tax 
payments for the household. For a more comprehensive description of the simulation 
procedure, see Nordström and Thunström (2009a). 
 
 
4. Estimation and simulation results 
F-tests indicate that the estimates of the parameters of the β  and δ  functions, in the original 
specification, are not significantly different from zero. We have therefore reduced the number 
of estimated parameters in the final specification of the model and excluded the household-
specific parameters from these functions. Likelihood ratio tests suggest that the homogeneity 
restriction generally cannot be rejected. Chi-square tests indicate that the symmetry 
restrictions are rejected for only two (pasta and bread) of the nine estimated demand systems, 
at a 5 percent significance level. The adjusted R-square is generally high and ranges from 0.2 
to 0.6. Overall, the model fit is found to be good.  
 
All own price elasticities are negative and in line with elasticities reported by previous studies 
(e.g., Chouinard et al., 2007, and Kuchler et al., 2005). The uncompensated own price 
elasticities range from -0.21 for wholegrain pasta to -1.56 for “other” breakfast cereals. There 
seems to be little difference in the price sensitivity for Keyhole-labeled bread or breakfast 
cereals compared to non-Keyhole products. The price sensitivity for the more unhealthy 
bakery products seems to be relatively low (around 0.60 for all subgroups) but the price 
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sensitivity for ready meals seems to be well in line with the price sensitivity for other groups. 
The rich set of cross-price elasticities is not reported in the table but is, as expected, much 
smaller in absolute value than the own price elasticities. Expenditure elasticities are also of 
the expected sign, ranging from 0.13 and 0.15 for filled pasta and white wheat crisp bread to 
1.16 and 1.45 for muesli and white wheat flour.  
 
In subsection 4.1 below, we report the impact of the different reforms on consumption and 
nutritional intake. Subsection 4.2 contains an analysis of the tax effects on the price level for 
different household types. 
 
4.1 The impact on consumption and tax payments of the simulated    
reforms 
 
(i) A removal of VAT on Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast cereals funded by 34.2  
       percent VAT on bakery goods and ready meals 
 
Removing the VAT on Keyhole-labeled products, and fully funding the reform by a tax on 
bakery goods and ready meals of 34.2 percent, results in only marginal increases in fiber 
intake, varying between 2 and 3 percent across the household categories (see Appendix). In 
addition, the effect of this reform on the price level facing different household types (as 
determined by their consumption basket) is minor. We therefore expect that removing the 
VAT on Keyhole-labeled products, while taxing bakery goods and ready meals, would have 
little if any effect on public health. We will focus our comments on the results of the more 
extensive tax reforms. 
 
Insert Tables 4.2a and 4.2b here.  
 
(ii)  A 50 percent subsidy of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast cereals funded by 
        113.8 percent VAT on bakery goods and ready meals 
 
Tables 4.2a and b show the results of the more extensive revenue-neutral VAT reform, where 
Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast cereals are subsidized by 50 percent, and bakery goods 
and ready meals are taxed with 113.8 percent VAT. The simulation suggests that this reform 
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results in all households, except couples with three or more children, attaining the 
recommendation of half of bread and breakfast cereal consumption being Keyhole labeled. 
Three household types experience an increase in fiber intake greater than the average 
household (35 percent) as a result of this reform – seniors, single women without children, 
and couples without children – and seniors even achieve the minimum recommended 38 
percent increase. The smallest increase in fiber intake is noted for households consisting of a 
single woman with children. The generally large increase in fiber intake is a result of all 
household types substantially increasing their proportions of Keyhole-labeled bread and 
breakfast cereals consumed. The increase in the fiber intake is, however, accompanied by 
increases in the intake of kilojoules and unhealthy nutrients (fat, saturated fat, salt, sugar and 
added sugar), even if the consumption share of bakery goods and ready meals shrinks for all 
household types. The latter is true for all household types except households consisting of two 
adults and three or more children and households of three or more adults.  
 
Even though all households experience sizeable increases in the intake of unhealthy nutrients, 
those that experience the highest increase in the intake of fiber also experience the highest 
increase in the intake in the unhealthy nutrients, and vice versa. This result implies that 
healthier, i.e., Keyhole-labeled, products contain both healthy and unhealthy ingredients, and 
that post-reform households choose a grain product basket that is not only higher in fiber but 
also higher in other nutrients. For instance, for seniors, the increase in the intake of salt and 
sugar is as high as 29 and 25 percent, respectively. Although increases are smaller for other 
household types, the pattern is similar. The net health effects on different household types of 
this reform are therefore uncertain.5  
 
Further, our results suggest that the household types that gain financially from the reform are 
couples without children and seniors, measured by a decrease in VAT payments. They seem 
to adjust their consumption such that their VAT payments from grain products decrease by 16 
and 61 percent, respectively. All families with children, as well as single women without 
children and single men, experience substantial increases in VAT payments as a result of this 
reform. 
 
                                                          
5 Since the initial nutritional quality of the diet of families with children is relatively poor compared to families 
without children, even relatively small increases of unhealthy nutrients might be important, though. 
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(iii) A SEK 0.046 subsidy per gram of fiber per kilogram of grain product funded by an  
         excise duty of SEK 0.182 per gram of added sugar 
 
Changes that may more efficiently control the intake of unhealthy nutrients could be excise 
duty reforms that directly target the nutrients, i.e., a subsidy of the fiber content funded by a 
tax on some, or some combination of, unhealthy nutrient(s). Here, we simulate the results 
across household types of the SEK 0.046 subsidy per gram of fiber per kilogram of grain 
product, funded by either an excise duty on added sugar, amounting to SEK 0.182 per gram of 
added sugar in grain products, or an excise duty on saturated fat, amounting to 0.325 per gram 
of saturated fat. Tables 4.3a-4.3b show the simulated results across household types of the 
SEK 0.046 fiber subsidy funded by a SEK 0.182 excise duty per gram of added sugar.6 
 
Insert Tables 4.3a-4.3b here. 
 
With the SEK 0.046 subsidy per gram of fiber per kilogram of product, funded by a SEK 
0.182 excise duty on each gram of added sugar, we find that single men and households 
consisting of three or more adults attain the recommendation of half of bread and breakfast 
cereal consumption being Keyhole labeled. However, for the other household types that did 
not attain this recommendation before the reform, and who initially had the lowest 
consumption share of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast cereals (households with children, 
i.e., single women with children, and couples with one, two, three, or more children), the 
reform does not achieve the recommendation of half of bread and breakfast cereal 
consumption being Keyhole labeled. Further, across all household types, our results suggest 
that the increase in fiber intake is lower than that achieved by the extensive VAT reform. 
However, the increase in unhealthy nutrients is also lower, with all household types even 
experiencing a decrease in the intake of added sugar. Those household categories with the 
                                                          
6 Note that the SEK 0.046 fiber subsidy results in the same increase in fiber intake for the average household (the 
minimum recommended 38 percent) as the 50 percent subsidy of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast cereals. 
Nordström and Thunström (2009a) show that the fiber subsidy is more cost efficient than the subsidy of 
Keyhole-labeled products. Here, both reforms are revenue neutral, however, since the subsidy of Keyhole-
labeled bread and breakfast cereals is funded by taxes on bakery goods and ready meals, and the fiber subsidy is 
funded by an excise duty on either added sugar or saturated fat. 
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highest consumption share of Keyhole-labeled products already, namely couples without 
children and seniors, show an increase in fiber intake from this reform higher than the average 
household (15 percent): our results suggest that the increase in fiber intake for couples 
without children would be 17 percent, and for seniors even higher, 20 percent. Again, 
however, those households with the largest increases in fiber intake also experience larger 
than average increases in their consumption of fat, saturated fat, kilojoules, and salt. In 
contrast, fiber intake increases only marginally for households with many children per adult. 
For households consisting of a single woman with one or more children, the fiber intake 
increases by 2 percent, whereas for households consisting of two adults with three or more 
children the fiber intake increases by only 1 percent. At the same time, the decrease in the 
intake of added sugar is particularly marked for these households: 22 percent for single 
women with children and 32 percent for two adults with three or more children.  
 
Similar to the VAT reform, couples without children and seniors are best off financially from 
the reform, since implementing the reform means a decrease in VAT and excise duty 
payments of 14 and 32 percent, respectively, for these household types. Generally, the 
increase in food tax payments by the other household types was still pronounced, though 
smaller than the increase from the VAT reform, the exception being households consisting of 
a couple with three or more children or households of three or more adults, who experience 
greater increases in food tax payments.  
 
(iv)  A SEK 0.046 subsidy per gram of fiber per kilogram of grain product funded by an  
        excise duty of SEK 0.325 per gram of saturated fat. 
 
Tables 4.4a-4.4b show the results across household types of the SEK 0.046 subsidy per gram 
of fiber funded by an excise duty of SEK 0.325 per gram of saturated fat.  
 
Insert Tables 4.4a-4.4b here. 
 
Simulating the impact of an SEK 0.046 subsidy per gram of fiber per kilogram of product, 
funded by an excise duty of SEK 0.325 per gram of saturated fat, we again find that the 
reform does not result in those households with the lowest initial consumption shares of 
Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast cereals (households with children – single women with 
children, couples with one, two, three, or more children) achieving the recommendation of 
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half of bread and breakfast cereal consumption being Keyhole labeled. And, again, for all 
household types the fiber intake increased by less than the increase under the VAT reform. 
Further, for most household types, the fiber intake increased by less than under the 
corresponding excise duty reform with an excise duty on added sugar, single women with 
children and couples with three or more children being the exception. However, for these 
household categories, the increase in fiber intake from this reform is still small (3 and 4 
percent, respectively) and, again, the only household types experiencing an above average 
increase in fiber intake are couples without children and seniors (increases of 13 and 15 
percent, respectively). All household types except seniors see a reduction in intake of both 
saturated fat and added sugar as a result of this reform, and most household types, with the 
exception of couples without children and seniors, see a reduction in fat intake. For seniors, 
the reform results in increases in all unhealthy ingredients, though the increases in saturated 
fat, added sugar, and sugar are marginal (1-2 percent). For single women without children and 
couples without children, too, we find increases in the majority of unhealthy ingredients. For 
the other household types, the general finding is that the intake of unhealthy ingredients 
decreases as a result of the reform.  
 
As with the VAT reform simulations and the excise duty reform with excise duty on added 
sugar, seniors and couples without children are financially better off after the above reform 
compared to baseline. VAT and excise duty payments by these households would decrease by 
27 and 14 percent, respectively, if the reform were implemented. Other household types 
would be financially worse off compared to baseline. Compared to the VAT reform, however, 
all households would be financially better off after this reform except for couples with three 
or more children, couples without children, and seniors. Compared to the excise duty reform 
with duty on added sugar, the reform with duty on saturated fat results in much higher 
increases in food tax for single women without children and single men, whereas single 
women with children, and couples with two, three, or more children would experience a much 
lower increase in food tax payments.  
 
 
4.2 Effects on price levels for different household types 
 
Insert Table 4.5 here. 
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Table 4.5 shows both the initial price levels faced by different household types and the 
relative change in price level (as measured by the antilog of Stone’s price index) as a result of 
household reallocations of consumption after the policy reforms. As shown by column 1 in 
Table 4.5, seniors and couples without children face the lowest initial price levels, whereas 
single women without children and single men with or without children face the highest price 
levels. 
 
Our results suggest that couples without children, couples with three or more children, and 
seniors would all face lower price levels than at baseline if the more extensive VAT reform 
(50 percent subsidy of Keyhole-labeled products, 113.8 percent VAT on bakery goods and 
ready meals) were implemented. The opposite is the case for all other household types. Best 
off are the seniors, who face a post-reform price level of 94 percent of the pre-reform level. 
The household types facing the highest increase in price level are single men with or without 
children and couples with two children; both groups face an increase in price level of 3 
percent compared to baseline.  
 
All household categories would see an increase in the price level they face for grain products 
if the SEK 0.046 fiber subsidy funded by a SEK 0.182 excise duty on added sugar were 
implemented, as shown by column 3 in Table 4.5. Further, all household types experience a 
higher increase in price level relative to the simulated price level increase from the VAT 
reform. The highest price increases are found for families with children, rising as much as 20 
percent for families of two adults and three or more children. For seniors and couples without 
children, the excise duty reform entailing a fiber subsidy funded by a tax on added sugar 
results in a smaller increase in price level than for the average household. For all other 
household types, the price level increases by more than for the average household.  
 
If we introduce the same fiber subsidy, funded instead by SEK 0.325 excise duty on saturated 
fat, the increase in the overall price level for different groups is less pronounced. Compared to 
the VAT reform, increases in the price level faced by all households are higher from this 
reform. Compared to an excise duty on added sugar, however, increases are lower, except for 
single men with or without children. Compared to baseline, the highest price increases are, 
nevertheless, again experienced by families with children. And compared to the other 
household types, the price increase for single men, with or without children, is relatively 
sizeable too, 5 percent.  
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5. Conclusions 
We estimated a demand system on grain consumption and thereafter simulated the effect 
across household types of four fully funded policy reforms designed to improve the quality of 
the grain diet. The policy objectives used in the paper are derived from nutritional 
recommendations for grain products of the Swedish National Food Administration (SLV). 
These recommendations are that the average consumer should double his/her consumption of 
bread and breakfast cereals, ensuring that half of the consumption is Keyhole labeled, as part 
of an overall objective of increasing the fiber intake by a minimum of 38 percent. 
 
The reforms simulated are: (a) a relatively small VAT reform of zero VAT on Keyhole-
labeled bread and breakfast cereals and 34.2 percent VAT on bakery goods and ready meals, 
while keeping the VAT on all other grain products at the initial 10.71 percent; (b) a more 
extensive VAT reform entailing a 50 percent subsidy of Keyhole-labeled products funded by 
113.8 percent VAT on bakery goods and ready meals; (c) an excise duty reform entailing a 
SEK 0.046 subsidy per gram of fiber per kilogram of grain product, funded by SEK 0.182 
excise duty per gram of added sugar per kilogram of product; and (d) an excise duty reform 
entailing a SEK 0.046 subsidy per gram of fiber per kilogram of product funded by SEK 
0.325 excise duty per gram of saturated fat per kilogram of grain product.  
 
The general findings for all the simulated reforms are that those households that see the 
greatest improvement in fiber intake and consumption of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast 
cereals – i.e., households without children (seniors, couples without children, and single 
women without children) – are those that already consume the highest proportion of Keyhole-
labeled products. In addition, our results suggest that seniors and couples without children are 
the household types that gain the most financially from all reforms simulated here compared 
to baseline. They would pay less food taxes if the reforms were implemented, and if the VAT 
reform were implemented, they would face a lower price level than before the reform, while 
for the excise duty reforms, they would see a lower increase in the price level than that 
experienced by the average household. These household types also face the lowest initial 
price level for grain products.  
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Households that initially consumed the lowest proportions of fiber-rich products (and 
generally consume less of nutritious food) – namely, families with children (single parents 
with one or more children and couples with one, two, or three and more children) – generally 
seem to gain the least financially from the reforms simulated here. Compared to baseline, they 
pay more food taxes if the reforms are implemented, and the reforms also result in relatively 
high increases in the price level they face, with this increase in price level generally higher 
than that experienced by the average household. Further, they generally experience an 
increase in fiber intake that is smaller than for the average household. However, all the 
reforms simulated here result in a reduced intake of added sugar for families with children 
(and in many cases also reductions in the intake of saturated fat), positively affecting the 
nutritional quality of their food consumption. Families with children generally overconsume 
both added sugar and saturated fat. 
 
However, any sizeable increase in the intake of fiber as a result of the reforms simulated here 
is generally accompanied by an increase in kilojoules and unhealthy nutrients (fat, saturated 
fat, salt, and sugar), even though the subsidies of fiber-rich products or the fiber content are 
funded by taxes on unhealthy nutrients. The higher the increase in the intake of fiber, the 
higher the increase in the intake of unhealthy nutrients. This means for example that seniors 
who experience high increases in the intake of fiber from all reforms also experience high 
increases in their intake of unhealthy nutrients. This might be due to fiber-rich products not 
only containing fiber, but also other ingredients (see Table 2.1), the intake of which will 
increase if the consumption of fiber-rich products increases. This result generally makes it 
difficult to evaluate the net health effect of implementing policy reforms designed to increase 
fiber intake. However, controlling the intake of unhealthy nutrients appears easier with excise 
duty reforms than with VAT reforms, and for some household types the intake of unhealthy 
nutrients even decreases. Unfortunately, excise duty reforms are harder to implement than 
VAT reforms.  
 
In contrast to Chouinard et al. (2007), we find no evidence of elderly being worse off 
financially compared to other groups from reforms designed to increase the nutritional content 
of the food intake. Our findings suggest that the elderly (seniors) and couples without children 
are well off, should tax reforms designed to encourage healthier grain consumption be 
implemented. These households gain the most, both nutritionally from increased fiber intake 
and financially from paying less food taxes – depending on the reform, facing either a lower 
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price level than before the reform or a lower increase in the price level than that faced by the 
average household. Those who seem to gain least from the reforms simulated here are 
families with children, who generally see a smaller than average increase in fiber intake, pay 
more food taxes, and face relatively high increases in price levels. 
 
The study has limitations in that it focuses only on grain consumption and assumes weak 
separability between grain and other consumption. Preferably, the demand system would be 
extended to include all household consumption. For instance, the difference between our 
results and those of Chouinard et al. (2007) could be due to analyses of different food groups. 
Also, financial measures are insufficient here in measuring welfare. The study assumes 
implicitly that health increases welfare and that increasing the fiber intake positively affects 
health, while increasing the intake of unhealthy nutrients negatively affects health. Ideally, we 
would know the net health effects of increases/decreases in the intake of different nutrients, 
and thereby be able to calculate welfare effects of the simulated reforms. Finally, it is 
important to consider distributional effects across other household dimensions, such as 
income groups. We leave these and other issues to future research. 
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 Table 2.1. Average contents of product groups, per 100 grams 
        
 KJ Total fat 
Saturated 
fat Sugar 
Added 
sugar Salt Fiber 
Bakery goods        
Cakes 1631.71 24.29 6.33 27.89 25.35 164.26 2.25 
Sweet buns 1633.77 20.12 8.23 11.64 6.32 267.47 2.12 
Tarts 1084.16 13.62 6.21 17.23 13.45 133.76 1.60 
        
Breakfast cereals        
Flakes 1568.93 1.95 0.35 13.46 10.12 895.30 4.23 
Keyhole-labeled 1448.28 3.67 0.51 2.65 1.73 199.00 9.88 
Muesli 1578.77 9.26 3.41 23.37 15.14 256.96 10.80 
Sweetened cereals 1614.75 1.26 0.25 38.39 28.86 467.08 2.56 
Others 1567.01 4.30 1.24 21.44 16.60 368.64 6.21 
        
Flours and dough        
Wholegrain flour 1417.67 2.33 0.28 2.74 0.43 2.64 4.62 
Flour for sauces 1407.06 0.69 0.09 1.13 0.51 4.48 3.03 
Keyhole-labeled 
flour 1344.52 3.33 0.48 1.24 0.65 3.41 10.89 
White wheat flour 1504.68 1.88 0.26 1.53 0.26 0.80 3.60 
Dough 2340.20 39.51 17.08 1.10 0.12 309.44 1.60 
        
Crisp bread        
Keyhole-labeled 1359.82 2.61 0.38 1.73 0.43 470.20 14.29 
White wheat 1636.54 7.41 1.79 4.52 0.42 417.19 5.38 
Brown 1425.18 3.98 0.99 3.56 0.29 540.53 11.78 
        
Pasta        
Fresh filled 708.24 9.15 4.07 0.98 0.14 522.37 0.83 
Fresh unfilled 877.06 1.61 0.42 1.01 0.10 297.63 1.78 
Filled 767.16 9.90 4.38 1.03 0.18 569.30 1.03 
Unfilled 528.50 0.50 0.05 0.20 0.10 1.00 1.12 
Wholegrain 473.30 0.52 0.06 0.17 0.10 0.10 3.04 
        
Ready meals        
Pancakes 807.95 8.81 3.73 4.37 0.01 331.15 0.77 
Pirogues, pan pizza 1541.16 23.43 10.11 1.82 0.31 533.81 1.36 
Pizza, pasta, lasagne 910.06 9.73 4.14 2.20 0.20 472.06 1.43 
Spring rolls 896.20 10.80 2.94 2.80 0.20 510.00 1.20 
Others 1024.73 13.26 5.88 2.07 0.25 462.82 1.36 
        
Rice        
Easy-cook 490.91 0.30 0.07 0.32 0.28 270.07 0.50 
Brown 443.54 0.70 0.18 0.49 0.32 2.62 1.12 
White 515.25 0.34 0.10 0.15 0.15 307.07 0.48 
Others 520.56 0.29 0.10 0.09 0.11 171.77 0.36 
        
Soft bread        
Brown 1025.82 3.07 0.55 6.03 0.31 358.77 6.47 
White 1160.12 4.11 0.81 4.07 0.21 404.35 3.62 
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Table 2.2. Household shares of healthy and unhealthy products 
   
Household type   
  
Share of Keyhole-labeled bread 
and breakfast cereals 
Share of bakery goods and  
ready meals 
Average household  0.47 0.03 
Single woman  0.52 0.05 
Single woman with children  0.33 0.03 
Single man with/without children   0.47 0.07 
Couple  0.52 0.02 
Couple with 1 child  0.39 0.03 
Couple with 2 children  0.39 0.03 
Couple with ≥  3 children  0.32 0.02 
Three adults  0.45 0.03 
Seniors  0.52 0.03 
   
 
 
Table 4.2a. Results of policy reform (ii), a 50 percent subsidy of Keyhole-labeled bread and 
breakfast cereals funded by 113.8 percent VAT on bakery goods and ready meals  
   HOUSEHOLD CATEGORY 
 Average household  
Single 
women 
Single 
women 
with ch. 
Single 
mena Couple 
Share of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast 
cereals, BR b 
0.47  0.52 0.33 0.47 0.52 
Share of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast 
cereals, AR b 0.69  0.71 0.56 0.69 0.72 
Share of bakery goods and ready meals, BR b 0.03  0.05 0.03 0.07 0.02 
Share of bakery goods and ready meals, AR b 0.02  0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 
Relative change in volumes and intake of 
nutrients       
Volumes of bread and breakfast cereals 0.38  0.41 0.22 0.35 0.42 
Volumes of bakery goods and ready meals -0.10  -0.16 -0.02 -0.28 -0.06 
Fiber 0.35  0.35 0.21 0.31 0.36 
Fat 0.12  0.10 0.02 0.04 0.15 
Saturated fat 0.05  0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.09 
Kilojoules 0.17  0.16 0.07 0.12 0.18 
Salt 0.21  0.19 0.08 0.15 0.24 
Sugar 0.21  0.19 0.09 0.20 0.23 
Added sugar 0.07  0.05 -0.01 0.08 0.10 
Effects on public revenues       
Average relative change in VAT and excise 
duty paid, in SEK 
0.00  0.91 1.08 1.78 -0.37 
       
Note: a with and without children. ch. = children, b BR = before reform, AR = after reform. 
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Table 4.2b. Results of policy reform (ii), a 50 percent subsidy of Keyhole-labeled bread and 
breakfast cereals funded by 113.8 percent VAT on bakery goods and ready meals 
 HOUSEHOLD CATEGORY 
 Couple, 1 child 
Couple,  
2 children 
Couple,  
≥  3 children 
Three 
adults Seniors 
Share of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast 
cereals, BR b 
0.39 0.39 0.32 0.41 0.55 
Share of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast 
cereals, AR b 0.61 0.62 0.46 0.63 0.75 
Share of bakery goods and ready meals, BR b 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Share of bakery goods and ready meals, AR b 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Relative change in volumes and intake of 
nutrients      
Volumes of bread and breakfast cereals 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.45 
Volumes of bakery goods and ready meals -0.11 -0.11 0.09 0.10 -0.11 
Fiber 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.30 0.38 
Fat 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.16 
Saturated fat -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.10 
Kilojoules 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.20 
Salt 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.29 
Sugar 0.11 0.14 0.06 0.15 0.25 
Added sugar -0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.03 0.10 
Effects on public revenues      
Average relative change in VAT and excise 
duty paid, in SEK 
0.78 1.06 0.20 0.02 -0.61 
      
Note: b BR = before reform, AR = after reform. 
 
 23
  
Table 4.3a. Results of policy reform (iii), a fiber subsidy of  SEK 0.046 funded by an excise 
duty per gram of added sugar of SEK 0.182 
   HOUSEHOLD CATEGORY 
 Average household 
 
Single 
women 
Single 
women 
with ch. 
Single 
mena Couple 
Share of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast 
cereals, BR b 
0.47  0.52 0.33 0.47 0.52 
Share of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast 
cereals, AR b 0.54  0.59 0.40 0.53 0.58 
Share of bakery goods and ready meals, BR b 0.03  0.05 0.03 0.07 0.02 
Share of bakery goods and ready meals, AR b 0.03  0.05 0.03 0.07 0.02 
Relative change in volumes and intake of 
nutrients       
Volumes of bread and breakfast cereals 0.03  0.05 -0.05 0.02 0.05 
Volumes of bakery goods and ready meals -0.10  -0.07 -0.13 -0.03 -0.09 
Fiber 0.15  0.14 0.02 0.08 0.17 
Fat 0.05  0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.08 
Saturated fat 0.00  0.00 -0.07 -0.03 0.02 
Kilojoules 0.10  0.09 0.00 0.04 0.12 
Salt 0.01  0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.02 
Sugar -0.04  -0.05 -0.17 -0.06 -0.02 
Added sugar -0.11  -0.10 -0.22 -0.10 -0.09 
Effects on public revenues       
Average relative change in VAT and excise 
duty paid, in SEK 
0.00  0.11 0.55 0.15 -0.14 
       
Note: a with and without children. ch. = children. b BR = before reform, AR = after reform. 
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Table 4.3b. Results of policy reform (iii), a fiber subsidy of  SEK 0.046 funded by an excise 
duty per gram of added sugar of SEK 0.182 
 HOUSEHOLD CATEGORY 
 Couple,  1 child 
Couple,  
2 children 
Couple,  
≥  3 children 
Three 
adults Seniors 
Share of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast 
cereals, BR b 
0.39 0.39 0.32 0.41 0.55 
Share of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast 
cereals, AR b 0.47 0.47 0.44 0.50 0.62 
Share of bakery goods and ready meals, BR b 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Share of bakery goods and ready meals, AR b 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Relative change in volumes and intake of 
nutrients      
Volumes of bread and breakfast cereals -0.02 -0.02 -0.28 0.01 0.07 
Volumes of bakery goods and ready meals -0.11 -0.11 -0.25 -0.18 -0.12 
Fiber 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.20 
Fat -0.01 0.00 -0.07 0.02 0.11 
Saturated fat -0.06 -0.05 -0.13 -0.03 0.05 
Kilojoules 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.07 0.16 
Salt -0.04 -0.05 -0.10 -0.04 0.04 
Sugar -0.14 -0.13 -0.22 -0.11 0.01 
Added sugar -0.22 -0.22 -0.32 -0.20 -0.05 
Effects on public revenues      
Average relative change in VAT and excise 
duty paid, in SEK 
0.38 0.33 2.13 0.13 -0.32 
      
Note: b BR = before reform, AR = after reform. 
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Table 4.4a. Results of policy reform (iv), a fiber subsidy of  SEK 0.046 funded by an excise 
duty per gram of saturated fat of SEK 0.325 
   HOUSEHOLD CATEGORY 
 Average household 
 
Single 
women 
Single 
women 
with ch. 
Single 
mena Couple 
Share of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast 
cereals, BR b 
0.47  0.52 0.33 0.47 0.52 
Share of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast 
cereals, AR b 0.52  0.57 0.37 0.52 0.57 
Share of bakery goods and ready meals, BR b 0.03  0.05 0.03 0.07 0.02 
Share of bakery goods and ready meals, AR b 0.02  0.05 0.03 0.06 0.02 
Relative change in volumes and intake of 
nutrients       
Volumes of bread and breakfast cereals 0.04  0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.06 
Volumes of bakery goods and ready meals -0.06  -0.07 -0.02 -0.14 -0.03 
Fiber 0.11  0.11 0.03 0.06 0.13 
Fat 0.01  0.00 -0.06 -0.05 0.03 
Saturated fat -0.03  -0.04 -0.09 -0.08 -0.01 
Kilojoules 0.05  0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.07 
Salt 0.02  0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.04 
Sugar 0.00  0.00 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 
Added sugar -0.01  -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 
Effects on public revenues       
Average relative change in VAT and excise 
duty paid, in SEK 
0.00  0.13 0.30 0.36 -0.14 
    
Note: a with and without children. ch. = children. b BR = before reform, AR = after reform. 
 
 26
  
Table 4.4b. Results of policy reform (iv), a fiber subsidy of  SEK 0.046 funded by an excise 
duty per gram of saturated fat of SEK 0.325 
 HOUSEHOLD CATEGORY 
 Couple, 1 child 
Couple,  
2 children 
Couple,  
≥  3 children 
Three 
adults Seniors 
Share of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast 
cereals, BR b 
0.39 0.39 0.32 0.41 0.55 
Share of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast 
cereals, AR b 0.44 0.44 0.26 0.46 0.60 
Share of bakery goods and ready meals, BR b 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Share of bakery goods and ready meals, AR b 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Relative change in volumes and intake of 
nutrients      
Volumes of bread and breakfast cereals 0.01 0.01 -0.14 0.04 0.07 
Volumes of bakery goods and ready meals -0.06 -0.08 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 
Fiber 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.15 
Fat -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 0.05 
Saturated fat -0.08 -0.10 -0.09 -0.05 0.01 
Kilojoules 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.09 
Salt -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.05 
Sugar -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 
Added sugar -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 0.01 
Effects on public revenues      
Average relative change in VAT and excise 
duty paid, in SEK 
0.24 0.36 0.89 0.01 -0.27 
      
Note: b BR = before reform, AR = after reform. 
 
Table 4.5. Overall price changes for different household categories as a result of policy 
reforms 
   RELATIVE PRICE CHANGES AS A RESULT OF 
 
Average 
price level, 
baseline 
 
VAT reform 
Subsidizing 
fiber, taxing 
added sugar 
Subsidizing 
fiber, taxing 
saturated fat 
Average household 34.87  0.97 1.04 1.02 
Single women 38.48  1.01 1.04 1.03 
Single women with children 35.30  1.02 1.15 1.05 
Single men with/without children  39.27  1.03 1.04 1.05 
Couple 34.17  0.95 1.03 1.01 
Couple with 1 child 35.42  1.02 1.10 1.04 
Couple with 2 children 34.88  1.03 1.09 1.06 
Couple with  3 children ≥ 34.19  0.99 1.20 1.05 
Three adults 34.76  1.00 1.09 1.04 
Seniors 33.81  0.94 1.01 0.99 
Note:  Excise duty reform (2a)F entails a SEK -0.046 excise duty per gram of fiber, funded by a SEK 0.182 
excise duty on added sugar. Excise duty reform (2b) entails a SEK -0.046 excise duty on fiber funded by a SEK 
0.325 excise duty on saturated fat. 
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Appendix 
 
Table a. Results of policy reform (i), zero VAT on Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast 
cereals funded by 34.2 percent VAT on bakery goods and ready meals  
   HOUSEHOLD CATEGORY 
 Average household 
 
Single 
women 
Single 
women 
with ch. 
Single 
men a Couple 
Share of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast 
cereals, BR b 
0.47  0.52 0.33 0.47 0.52 
Share of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast 
cereals, AR b 0.50  0.55 0.36 0.51 0.55 
Share of bakery goods and ready meals, BR b 0.03  0.05 0.03 0.07 0.02 
Share of bakery goods and ready meals, AR b 0.03  0.05 0.03 0.06 0.02 
Relative change in volumes and intake of 
nutrients       
Volumes of bread and breakfast cereals 0.03  0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 
Volumes of bakery goods and ready meals -0.01  -0.04 0.02 -0.09 0.01 
Fiber 0.03  0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Fat 0.00  -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 
Saturated fat -0.01  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 
Kilojoules 0.01  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Salt 0.01  0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
Sugar 0.01  0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 
Added sugar 0.00  -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
Effects on public revenues       
Average relative change in VAT and excise 
duty paid, in SEK 
00.00  0.16 0.22 0.36 -0.08 
       
Note: a with and without children. ch. = children. b BR = before reform, AR = after reform. 
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Table b. Results of policy reform (i), zero VAT on Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast 
cereals funded by 34.2 percent VAT on bakery goods and ready meals  
 HOUSEHOLD CATEGORY 
 Couple, one child 
Couple,  
2 children 
Couple,  
3 children 
Three 
adults Seniors 
Share of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast 
cereals, BR b 
0.39 0.39 0.32 0.45 0.52 
Share of Keyhole-labeled bread and breakfast 
cereals, AR b 0.42 0.43 0.21 0.49 0.55 
Share of bakery goods and ready meals, BR b 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Share of bakery goods and ready meals, AR b 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Relative change in volumes and intake of 
nutrients      
Volumes of bread and breakfast cereals 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Volumes of bakery goods and ready meals -0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.02 
Fiber 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Fat -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Saturated fat -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
Kilojoules 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Salt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Sugar 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 
Added sugar -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
Effects on public revenues      
Average relative change in VAT and excise 
duty paid, in SEK 
0.15 0.23 0.05 -0.10 -0.02 
      
Note: b BR = before reform, AR = after reform. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
